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BLIND JUSTICE: POLICE SHOOTINGS
IN MEMPHIS*
JAMES J. FYFE**
The literature on police use of deadly force' has produced two
major findings. First, researchers report extreme variation in rates of
police shooting among American jurisdictions. 2 Second, regardless of its
geographic scope, the research invariably reports that the percentage of
police shootings involving black victims far exceeds the percentage of
blacks in the population.3 This paper examines factors affecting both of
these findings.
I. INTERJURISDICTIONAL VARIATIONS
Attempts to identify sources of interjurisdictional shooting rate va-
riation have produced mixed results. Milton suggests that differences
among shooting rates are associated with differences in levels of commu-
nity violence and risk to officers. 4 Kania and Mackey, in an attempt to
test two related hypotheses, report strong associations between fatal po-
lice shooting rates and public homicide and arrest rates over the 50
* An earlier version of this article was presented to the annual meeting of the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences, Philadelphia, March 1981.
** Associate Professor, College of Public and International Affairs, School of Justice, The
American University; Senior Fellow, Police Foundation; M.A., Ph.D. School of Cririminal Jus-
tice, State University of New York at Albany, 1978; B.S. John Jay College of Criminal Jus-
tice, City University of New York.
I "Deadly Force" generally is defined as force likely to kill or capable of killing. Since
police deadly force most often occurs when police point and fire their guns at other human
beings, and since such actions do not always result in death, "police deadly force" will be
defined in this paper to include all police shootings at others.
2 See C. MILTON, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (1977); Kania & Mackey, Police Violence
as a Function of Community Characteristics, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1977); Kiernan, Shooting by Po-
licemen in District Declines, Wash. Star, Sept. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 2; Sherman & Langworthy,
Measuring Homicide by Police Ojfcers, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 546 (1979).
3 See C. MILTON, supra note 2, at 22; Fyfe, Race andExtreme Police-Citizen Violence, in RACE,
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 89 (C.E. Pope & R. McNeely eds. 1981); Harding & Fahey,
Killings by Chicago Police, 1969-70. An Empirical Study, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 284 (1973); Kobler,
Police Homicide in a Democracy, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 163 (1975); Meyer, Police Shootings at Minorites:
The Case of Los Angeles, in 452 ANNALS 98 (1980); Takagi, A Garrison State in "Democratic"
Society, in POLICE-COMMUNrrY RELATIONS 357-71 (A. Cohn & E. Viano eds. 1976).
4 C. MILTON, suzra note 2, at 144.
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states. 5 Despite flaws in the data employed by Kania and Mackey,6
their thesis, that shootings are associated with community violence and
risk to officers, is supported by Fyfe. He reports close associations be-
tween police shooting rates and arrest and homicide rates across the geo-
graphic subdivisions of a single large police jurisdiction, where internal
organizational policies and practices which might influence shooting
rates are presumably constant. 7 The relative influence upon police
shooting rates of such internal policies and practices is suggested by
Kiernan, who found that police shooting rates among nine American
cities vary by as much as 1500% even when controlling for a measure of
community violence and police exposure to shootings (arrests for violent
felonies) .8
Kiernan's suggestion that police internal organizational variables
also affect shooting rates is reinforced by Uelman, who reports that the
major determinants of the levels of police shooting in the California
agencies he studied were the "personal philosophies" of police chiefs and
the administrative controls they devised. 9 Thus, variations in the shoot-
ing rates of American police jurisdictions apparently are associated both
with "external" variables (e.g., community violence; threats to officer
safety) and with "internal" variables (e.g., administrative philosophies;
adequacy of training; restrictiveness of police shooting policies; intensity
of shooting incident review).
II. BLACK DISPROPORTION
Goldkamp's survey of the literature of police deadly force offers a
similar and useful construct of researchers' theories regarding minority
disproportion among those shot and shot at by police. 10 Those who
have studied deadly force, he states, subscribe to one of two "Belief Per-
spectives." Belief Perspective I holds that minority overrepresentation
among shooting victims is a result of'differential police practices: that
5 Kania & Mackey, supra note 2.
6 Kania and Mackey necessarily included in their analysis only data on fatal police shoot-
ings, thus excluding many nonfatal exercises of police deadly force. Further, their data on
fatal shootings were obtained from the United States Vital Statistics' annual reports on
Causes of Mortality, a source subsequently found highly unreliable by Sherman & Langwor-
thy, supra note 2, at 559.
7 Fyfe, Geographic Correlates ofPolice Shooting: A Mzcroanalysis, 17 J. RESEARCH CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 101 (1980).
8 Kiernan, supra note 2.
9 Uelman, Varieties ofPolice Policy: A Study ofPolice Policy Regarding the Use o(Deadly Force in
Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1973). See also Fyfe, Administrative Interoention on
Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979); Sherman &
Langworthy, supra note 2.
10 Goldkamp, Minorities as Victims of Police Shootings: Interpretations ofRacial Disproportionali
and Police Use ofDeady Force, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 169 (1976).
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"police have one trigger finger for whites, and another for blacks.""u
This perspective, therefore, attributes black disproportion among shoot-
ing victims to variables internal to police organizations (e.g. racism by
officers and by the administrators who encourage or allow them to ex-
press it by shooting blacks in situations in which they would refrain
from shooting whites). Belief Perspective II views black shooting victim
disproportion as a consequence of variables external to police organiza-
tions. From this perspective, black shooting victim disproportion is seen
as a consequence of justifiable police responses to the relatively great
involvement of blacks in violent crime and other activities likely to pre-
cipitate shooting. 12
Since the formulation of Goldkamp's two Belief 'Perspectives, there
has been considerable research into the relationship of race and police
shootings. Fyfe -found that black disproportion among New York City
police shooting victims was closely associated with the representation of
blacks among violent crime arrestees and among homicide victims.13
Belief Perspective II is also supported by Blumberg's study of police
shootings in Atlanta and Kansas City, which, like Fyfe's work, reports
little variation in the degree of danger confronted by police officers in-
volved in shootings of citizens of different racial groups. 14
Despite these apparent confirmations of Belief Perspective II, it is
possible that the relationships between high rates of police shooting vic-
timization and indications of black violence are artifacts of differential
police enforcement and reporting practices. In other words, it may be
that the relationship between black shooting rates and black arrest rates
is a result of arbitrariness in arrest and crime reporting practices, as well
as in shooting practices. Further, given great interjurisdictional varia-
tion in police shooting rates, it is also possible that the validity of either
of Goldkamp's two Belief Perspectives is place dependent.
In jurisdictions where police shooting is infrequent and closely con-
trolled by stringent policies and incident review procedures conducted
by administrators whose personal philosophies mitigate against arbi-
trary shootings, black disproportion may be explained by Belief Perspec-
tive II. In such places, it may be that internal organizational strategies
have minimized officer arbitrariness, and that external variables (e.g.,
crime rate differentials among the races) do account for black shooting
11 Id at 170 (quoting Takagi, supra note 3).
12 Id at 173.
13 Fyfe, supra note 3, at 93-94.
14 M. Blumberg, Race and Police Shootings: An Analysis in Two Cities, (1980) (paper
presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology). See also W. GEL-
LER & K. KARALES, SPLIT SECOND DECISION: SHOOTINGS OF AND By CHICAGO POLICE
(1981).
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victim disproportion. Conversely, in jurisdictions characterized by high
police shooting rates and loose or non-existent training, shooting policies
and review procedures, it may be that officers are exercising their broad
discretion in a manner that validates Belief Perspective I. In such
places, it may be true that officers shoot blacks in situations in which
they would refrain from shooting whites, and that their actions are con-
gruent with the personal philosophies of their supervisors. In view of the
wide range in restrictiveness of police shooting policies and other inter-
nal organizational variables across jurisdictions,- 5 therefore, it would be
surprising if either Belief Perspective I or Belief Perspective II was uni-
versally valid among American police agencies. Indeed, it may be that
the empirical support for Belief Perspective II exists because research
access has been granted by only those police agencies that have at-
tempted to control shooting discretion in a manner that minimizes the
opportunity for officers to exercise "differential trigger fingers," and
which, consequently, have little fear that researchers will publish embar-
rassing findings.
III. A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
Blumberg has commented that without "baseline data with regard
to the situational characteristics of all police-citizen encounters . ., it is
not possible to definitively refute the contention that the police are not
more likely to shoot blacks than whites under the same circum-
stances."' 6 Such an observation applies equally to interjurisdictional
variation. Without data on situations characteristic of all police-citizen
encounters, it may not be possible to identify definitively the sources of
interjurisdictional shooting variations.
Data regarding all police-citizen encounters are not likely to be-
come available in the foreseeable future, but this author has argued that
a useful surrogate may be found in data related to the situational char-
acteristics of police shootings.' 7
At the most basic level, police shootings may be dichotomized into
"elective" shootings (those in which the officer involved may elect to
shoot or not to shoot at little or no risk to himself or others), and
"nonelective" shootings (those in which the officer has little real choice
but to shoot or to risk death or serious injury to himself or others). Like
elective surgery, elective shootings-those involving unarmed fleeing
property criminals, for example-are real exercises in discretion. Thus,
15 See Uelman, suira note 9.
16 M. Blumberg, supira note 14, at i.
17 Fyfe, Towarda Typologv of Police Shootings in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LAW ENFORCE-
MENT 136-151 (J. Fyfe, ed. 1981).
[Vol. 73
POLICE SHOOTINGS IN MEMPHIS
they are subject to reduction by internal police policies and practices
designed to limit officer discretion. The chief can direct his officers not
to shoot at the backs of unarmed fleeing property crime suspects without
increasing risk to officers caused by encounters with such suspects.
Nonelective shootings, by contrast, are largely a consequence of influ-
ences external to the police agency, and are less subject to administra-
tive control strategies. The police chief has little direct control over the
number or ethnic groups of armed robbers in his jurisdiction, nor can he
direct officers not to resort to firearms when they come face to face with
them in life-threatening circumstances.
Stated most simply, elective shooting rates are most greatly influ-
enced by factors internal to police organizations, and nonelective shoot-
ing rates are most greatly influenced by factors external to police
organizations."'
From this perspective, it is clear that aggregate shooting rates-
either among police jurisdictions or among victim racial distributions-
are of minimal informational value. If one is to know whether the police
are "more trigger happy" in some jurisdictions than others, one must
know something about the situations in which officers in those jurisdic-
tions shoot at other human beings. To know whether police differenti-
ate along racial lines with their trigger fingers, one must know
something about the situations in which police shoot at members of dif-
ferent racial groups.
Thus, this author suggested the utility of a typology of police shoot-
ing based on a "scale of immediate hazard" to the officer.' 9 Using "de-
gree of officer injury" as a criterion, such a scale (with eleven separate
shooting types, which varied from clearly elective events to clearly
18 The elective/nonelective dichotomy proposed here is an.attempt to simplify very com-
plex phenomena. It should not be interpreted as a suggestion that nonelective shootings do
not vary in degree of immediacy of hazard to the officers involved, or as a suggestion that
nonelective shooting rates are not affected at all by internal police organizational variables.
Two officers attacked by a lone man with a knife, for example, probably face less danger and
have more alternatives to shooting than a lone officer who is fired upon without warning by
several bankrobbers armed with shotguns. Indeed, if the officers in the knife situation are
trained and equipped to employ nonlethal means of subduing their assailant without endan-
gering themselves (e.g., evasive or self-defense tactics; electronic "stun-guns;" chemical sprays;
nets, etc.), any resulting shooting should be classified as elective. Conversely, if the officers are
poorly trained and equipped, they may find themselves without alternatives to shooting, so
that such an event would most accurately be classified as nonelective shooting. It is doubtful,
however, that any existing training program or technology would provide the officer in the
bank robbery situation with alternatives to shooting. Thus, a more detailed alternative to the
elective/nonelective dichotomy would be a continuum which classified shootings along a
scale ranging from elective to nonelective on the basis of gravity and hazard to officers and
others, and availability of alternatives to shootings. Such a continuum (modified to fit data
limitations) is employed in the remainder of this article.
19 Fyfe, supra note 17.
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nonelective events) was constructed and used in this author's analysis of
New York City police shootings; it was found that the situations in
which officers shot blacks threatened life relatively more often and more
seriously (and, thus were more often nonelective) than those in which
they shot whites.2 0 Blumberg employed a similar typology with similar
results in his study of Atlanta and Kansas City police shootings. 2' This
paper employs such a hazard based typology to examine comparative
shooting rates in Memphis and New York City, and to examine black
shooting disproportion in Memphis.
DATA SOURCES
The New York City shooting data used in this research are part of a
data set which includes all reported incidents in which members of that
agency discharged firearms and/or were seriously assaulted or killed be-
tween January 1, 1971, and December 31, 1975. For the purposes of this
analysis, only those reports involving shootings were employed.
The Memphis shooting data employed herein cover slightly differ-
ent time periods, and were provided by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, which had obtained them in connection with a civil suit resulting
from a police shooting in that city.22 They consist of a Memphis Police
Department condensation of the circumstances in which officers in that
agency employed deadly force against property crime suspects, as well as
summary data on other uses of firearms during the years 1969-74. In
addition, this research employs data on all fatal police shootings in
Memphis during 1969-76, except for those occurring between January
16 and December 31, 1972, a period for which no information is avail-
able.23 In neither city was any attempt made to reconcile these official
versions of shootings with other accounts.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. INTERJURISDICTIONAL VARIATIONS: MEMPHIS AND NEW YORK
CITY
Table 1 presents the aggregate data for New York City and Mem-
phis police shootings, along with mean annual rates of shooting per
1,000 officers. The table shows that between 1969 and 1974, firearms
20 Fyfe, Shots Fired: An Examination of New York City Police Firearms Discharges 921
(1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany).
21 M. Blumberg, supra note 14, at i.
22 Garner v. Memphis, No. 77-1089 (6th Cir. 1979). The author is grateful to Steve Win-
ter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for making the data available.
23 TENNESSEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL
CRISIS--CIvIC CHALLENGE: POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN MEMPHIS (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as TENNESSEE ADVISORY COMMITEE].
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were discharged by one or more Memphis police officers on 225 separate
occasions, producing a mean annual rate of 33.5 shootings per 1,000
officers. In New York City during 1971-75, there were 2,926 such inci-
dents, producing a mean annual rate of 19.2 shootings per 1,000 officers.
TABLE 1
POLICE SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN MEMPHIS AND
NEw YORK CITY
MEMPHIS NEw YORK CITY
MEASURE' 1969-74 1971-75
Number of Police
Shootings 225 2,926
Mean Annual Police
Shooting Rate Per
1,000 Officers 33.5 19.6
These aggregate rates indicate that Memphis police use their guns
considerably more often than their New York City counterparts. They
tell us little, however, of the variations in violence and police hazard
generally in those cities. Nor are they informative on the questions of
percentages or rates of elective and nonelective shootings in Memphis
and New York. Indeed, as explained below, not all of the shootings de-
scribed in Table 1 involve shootings at other persons.
Table 2 presents surrogate measures of general police hazard in
Memphis and New York City. As noted earlier, these were found by
this author to be closely associated with police shooting rates over New
York's 20 police subjurisdictions where internal influences (policy, train-
ing, etc.) presumably were held relatively constant. 24 In that study,
strong relationships between police shooting rates and the external influ-
ences of community violence (shooting rate per 1,000 officers and mur-
der/non-negligent manslaughter rate per 100,000 population, where r =
+.78) and police confrontations with violent suspects (shooting rate and
rate of arrest for violent felonies, where r = +.62) were reported.25 Ta-
ble 2 suggests, however, that these external influences are not associated
with the differences in shooting rates between Memphis and New York.
The table indicates that F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports derived murder
rates per 100,000 population were relatively similar in those cities dur-
ing the periods studied (Memphis = 2.97; New York = 2.75), and that
New York City police annually effected approximately twice as many
24 Fyfe, supra note 7.
25 Id at 107.
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violent felony arrests per 1,000 officers (1148.13) as Memphis officers
(587.12). Further, the table's rates of police shootings per 1,000 violent
felony arrests effected indicate that Memphis officers were more than
three times as likely to have used their guns in relation to this measure of
police hazard than were New York officers (rates = 56.98 and 16.71,
respectively).
TABLE 2
MEASURES OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE, POLICE HAZARD AND POLICE
SHOOTING IN MEMPHIS AND NEW YORK CITY
MEMPHIS NEW YORK CITY
MEASURE 1969-74 197 1-75
Mean Annual Murder/Non-
Negligent Manslaughter Rate
per 100,000 Population 2.97 2.75
Mean Annual Violent Felony
Arrest Rate per 1,000
Officersa 587.12 1172.95
Police Shooting Rate per
1,000 Violent Felony Arrests 56.98 16.71
a Includes arrests for murder/nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault.
The absence of association between variations in these measures
and variations in Memphis and New York City police shooting rates
suggests that varying internal police organizational influences may be
operative. In Table 3, the reasons for shooting given by the officers in-
volved in the incidents in each city are presented. Before any attempt is
made to interpret the table, however, several caveats are in order. The
Memphis data include shootings to "apprehend violent suspects" within
the "Defend Life" category, regardless of whether the officers or others
were in imminent danger at the time shots were fired or whether the
"violent suspect" was fleeing from a violent crime that had already been
completed. Thus, the Memphis "Defend Life" cell includes both elec-
tive and nonelective shootings. Conversely, only nonelective shootings
in which officers reported that they or others were subjects of attempted,
threatened, or successfully completed deadly assaults at the instant of
shooting are included in the New York City cell for the "Defend Life"
category. Consequently, the Memphis "Apprehend Suspects" cell in-
cludes only shootings to apprehend property crime suspects, while the
New York City "Apprehend Suspects" cell includes shootings to appre-
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hend persons suspected of both property crimes and crimes of personal
violence. Thus, the table understates the differences between Memphis
and New York City in both the nonelective "Defend Life" and elective
"Apprehend Suspects" categories. Finally, the aggregate Memphis
figures upon which this table is based permit no analysis of the severity
of threats to life precipitating shooting in that city; no data regarding
suspect's weapon, etc., are available.
TABLE 3
OFFICER'S REASON FOR SHOOTING IN MEMPHIS AND
NEw YORK CITY
MEMPHIS NEW YORK CITY
MEASURE 1969-74 1971-75
Defend Lifea 28.0% (n=63) 60.2% (1760)
rateb 9.4 11.8
Apprehend Suspectsc 50.7% (114) 6.1% (179)
rate 16.9 1.2
Accidental 4.9% (11) 8.5% (249)
rate 1.6 1.7
Destroy Animal 5.8% (13) 9.2% (270)
rate 1.9 1.8
Warning Shots 4.4% (10) 11.1% (326)
rate 2.1 2.2
Miscellaneous d  4.4% (10) 4.9% (142)
rate 1.5 1.0
TOTAL 100.0% (225) 100.0% (2926)
RATE 33.5c 19.6
chi-square = 414.18, df 5
p < .001
a Memphis "Defend Life" includes apprehensions of "violent suspects;" New York does not.
b Rate = mean annual rate per 1,000 officers.
C Memphis "Apprehend Suspects" includes only apprehensions of property crime suspects;
New York includes apprehensions of property crime and personal violence crime suspects.
d Memphis = not ascertained; New York = suicides, criminal shootings, etc.
C Subcell rates may not equal totals due to rounding.
Given those limitations, the table shows great differences in the rea-
sons given for shooting by officers in Memphis and New York City (p
.001). Three fifths (60.2%) of the New York City shootings reportedly
occurred in defense of the lives of officers or others, while only slightly
more than one fourth of the Memphis shootings involved either the de-
fense of life or the apprehension of persons suspected of crimes of vio-
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lence. Conversely, half (50.7%) of the Memphis shootings involved
apprehensions of property crime suspects, while only one in seventeen
(6.1%) of the New York shootings was precipitated by attempts to ap-
prehend persons suspected of either property crimes or crimes of
violence.
Even more striking that these percentage differences are the varia-
tions in annual shooting rates per 1,000 officers. Memphis officers were
less likely than New York officers to shoot in defense of life (rates = 9.4
and 11.8, respectively), especially given that the Memphis shootings in
this category include an unknown number of "violent suspect apprehen-
sions" which were presumably elective in that the lives of officers or
others were not in imminent danger. On the other hand, Memphis of-
ficers were at least fourteen times as likely as New York City officers to
have fired in order to apprehend property crime suspects (Memphis
property crime apprehension rate = 16.9; New York property and vio-
lent crime apprehension rate = 1.2). Interestingly, rates in the remain-
der of the table's cells-which generally do not involve authorized
intentional shootings at other persons-are remarkably consistent be-
tween Memphis and New York City.
Before concluding that the variation in shooting rates between
Memphis ,and New York is attributable to the great frequency with
which Memphis officers engage in elective shootings of fleeing property
crime suspects, an alternative explanation of these differences should be
considered. Because the data analyzed in this study are based upon of-
ficers' reports of shootings rather than upon direct observations of such
incidents, it is possible that any differences found are attributable to
differential police reporting practices rather than to differential police
shooting practices. Several considerations, however, suggest that this is
not the case.
First, the Memphis-New York difference in Apprehend Suspects
shooting rates (16.9 - 1.2 = 15.7) is greater than the total shooting rate
difference between Memphis and New York (33.5 - 19.2 = 14.3). A
difference of such magnitude amid the relative constancy of the other
categories in Table 3 suggests that it could not be accounted for by dif-
ferential reporting practices absent a massive conspiracy of report falsifi-
cation and disposal of dead and wounded citizens by New York police
officers and their superiors. If the New York rate for the Apprehend
Suspects category were, in fact, identical to the Memphis rate, the
number of such incidents in New York City during the period studied
would have exceeded 2,500. Both logic and experience (the author was
a member of the New York City Police Department for 16 years during
which time he collected the New York data analyzed in this paper) sug-
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gest that, even in that large city, 2,500 police shootings cannot be con-
cealed from the public, the media and researchers.
Given the implausibility of this alternate explanation, the table
provides strong evidence that the variation in shooting rates between
Memphis and New York is largely attributable to the great frequency
with which Memphis officers engaged in elective shootings of fleeing
property crime suspects in the years studied in this paper. As indicated
earlier, such relatively unrestrained use of firearms in elective shootings
at fleeing property crime suspects suggests that internal agency controls
in policy shooting are loose or nonexistent. In other work, this author
has reported that the 1972 imposition of restrictive shooting policy
guidelines and accompanying internal review procedures were associ-
ated with a 75 percent decrease in New York City shootings at fleeing
suspects.26 Those guidelines describe the New York City officer's
weapon as an instrument to be carried "for personal protection against
persons feloniously attacking an officer or another at close range,"2 7 and
are enforced stringently. During the period after which the guidelines
become operative, fewer than one fourth of the New York City officers
who fired at unarmed persons escaped departmental censure or arrest.28
Thus, it is useful to examine the shooting guidelines operative in
Memphis at the time the shootings analyzed in this study occurred. The
1975 Memphis Police department regulations, the most contemporane-
ous available, state in their entirety:
Use of force: Officers are confronted daily with situations where control
must be exercised to effect arrests and to protect the public safety. Control
may be achieved through advice, warnings, and persuasion, or by the use
of physical force. While the use of reasonable physical force may be neces-
sary in situations which cannot be otherwise controlled, force may not be
resorted to unless other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or
would clearly be ineffective under the particular circumstances. Officers
are permitted to use whatever force is reasonable and necessary to protect
others or themselves from bodily harm. 29
Self Defense and Defense of Others: The law of justifiable homicide au-
thorizes an officer to use deadly force when it is necessary to protect him-
self or others from what reasonably appears as an immediate threat of
great bodily harm or from imminent peril of death. The policy of the
Department does not limit that law. Under certain specirdconditions, deadly
force may be exercised against a fleeing felon.30
26 Fyfe, supra note 9, at 318.
27 New York City Police Department, Temporar, Operating Procedure 237 (1972).
28 J. Fyfe, Police Shootings in Philadelphia, 1975-1978: A System Model Analysis 43
(1980) (unpublished consultant paper presented to U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division).
29 Memphis Police Department, Policies and Regulations 5 (1975).
30 Id at 9 (emphasis added).
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Of these guidelines, the Tennessee Advisory Committee to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights observes that:
Nowhere in the department's Policies and Regulations are those "certain
specified conditions" written. It might assume conditions cited in the first
paragraph, "Use of Force," apply. But that is not stated. The results of
such broad State law and departmental policies appear to have been the
frequent use of deadly force by Memphis police officers; use primarily em-
ployed against black Memphians. 3 1
Thus, the committee suggests that black disproportion among
Memphis police shooting victims is a consequence of the absence of clear
shooting guidelines. 32 If that assertion is correct, it may also be true that
Goldkamp's Belief Perspective I-that police shoot blacks in situations
less threatening than those in which they shoot whites3 3 -was also valid
in Memphis during 1969-74.
B. BLACK DISPROPORTION IN MEMPHIS
As noted earlier, research that reports that blacks were shot or shot
at by police in circumstances at least as life-threatening as those in
which whites were shot was conducted in cities (Atlanta, Kansas City
and New York City) where stringent shooting guidelines had been in
place for some time.34 Thus, it is useful to examine black shooting vic-
tim disproportion in Memphis, a city in which police shooting guide-
lines were very loose during the years studied and in which the pattern
and frequency of shooting varied so much from at least one such city, in
order to see whether similar results will obtain.
Table 4 presents a crosstabulation of the races and injuries of prop-
erty crime suspects shot at by Memphis police during 1969-74 (race data
on persons shot at in other incidents were not available). The table
shows that 85.7% of those shot at were black, and that 14.3% were white,
with similar racial distributions among all injury categories. Again,
however, these aggregate percentages tell little about the relative pres-
ence of blacks in either the general population or the Memphis prop-
erty-crime population. Thus, several rates were constructed to put these
percentages in better perspective.
31 TENNESSEE ADvISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 23, at 80.
32 Memphis police officers are also limited in their use of deadly force by Tennessee state
law. In addition to allowing officers to shoot in order to defend their lives or the lives of other
innocent persons, the Tennessee statute defining officers' power to use deadly force in felony
arrest situations states, "[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee
or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. TENN. CODE
ANN. ch. 40, § 808.
33 See Goldkamp, supra note 10.
34 Fyfe, supra note 3, at 102; M. Blumberg, supra note 14, at 10.
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TABLE 4
RACE AND INJURY OF PROPERTY CRIME SUSPECTS SHOT AT BY
MEMPHIS POLICE, 1969-1974
SUSPECT'S RACE SUSPECT INJURY
NONE WOUNDED KILLED TOTALS
WHITE 13.6% (11) 7.1% (1) 23.5% (4) 14.3% (16)
rate per 1,000 officersa 1.6 0.1 0.6 2.4
rate per 100,000
populationb 2.9 0.3 1.0 4.2
rate per 1,000 arrestsc 1.2 0.1 0.5 1.8
BLACK 86.4% (70) 92.9% (13) 76.5% (13) 85.7% (96)
rate per 1,000 officers 10.4 1.9 1.9 14.3
rate per 100,000 1.7
population 28.9 5.4 5.4 39.6
rate per 1,000 arrests 3.2 0.6 0.6 3.2
TOTALSd 72.3% (81) 12.5% (14) 15.2% (17)100.0% (112)
rate per 1,000 officers 12.0 2.1 2.5 16.9
rate per 100,000
population 13.0 2.2 2.7 18.0
rate per 1,000 arrests 2.6 0.5 0.5 3.6
n/a = 2
a mean annual rate per 1,000 officers.
b rate per 100,000 population.
C rate per 1,000 arrests for burglary, larceny, auto larceny.
d subcell rates may not equal totals due to rounding.
First, the rate per 1,000 officers shows that, between 1969 and 1974,
Memphis police were six times as likely to have shot at and missed black
property crime suspects as they were for whites (noninjured rates = 10.4
and 1.6 per 1,000 officers annually), that they were 13 times more likely
to have wounded blacks than whites under such circumstances (rounded
black rate = 1.9; rounded white rate = 0.1), and that they were three
times more likely to have killed blacks than whites at scenes of property
crimes (rates = 1.9 and 0.6).
The second set of rates shows that black Memphians were nearly
ten times as likely as whites to have been shot at in such circumstances
(rates per 100,000 population = 39.6 and 4.2). Further, standardizing
the table's raw figures on each racial group's population in this way
shows that blacks were 18 times more likely to have been wounded
(black wounded rate = 5.4; white = 0.3), and more than five times as
likely to have been killed in these situations than were their fellow white
citizens (black killed rate = 5.4; white = 1.0).
Neither of these rates, of course, gives a precise measure of the de-
gree to which blacks disproportionately may expose themselves to the
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risk of being shot while fleeing from officers at scenes of property crimes.
Thus, the third set of rates presents the number of persons shot at for
each category per 1,000 property criminals of that same category ar-
rested by Memphis police. Here again, one finds great disproportion.
During the years studied, 4.3 black property crime suspects were shot at
for each 1,000 black property crime arrestees; the comparable white rate
is 1.8. The table also indicates that the black wounded rate (0.6) is six
times higher than the white rate (0.1), and that the black non-injured
rate (3.2) is nearly three times higher than the white rate (1.2).
This last rate may hide other sources of this variation (e.g., the legal
categories used to define "property crimes" include many divergent ac-
tivities; blacks may run from property crimes, while whites surrender).
Even given this possibility, however, the table suggests that Memphis
blacks were in far greater risk of being shot or shot at in these circum-
stances than can be explained by either their presence in the general
population or the arrestee population.
Similar inferences may be drawn from Table 5, which crosstabu-
lates the actions and races of persons fatally shot by Memphis police
during 1969-76 (less the period January 15 to December 31, 1972). The
table shows that more than three fourths (26) of the 34 persons whose
race is known were black. Half of these blacks (13) were reportedly un-
armed and nonassaultive at the time of their death. Only one of the
eight whites shot and killed died in such an elective event. This dispar-
ity yields a black death rate from police shootings while unarmed and
nonassaultive (5.4 per 100,000) that is 18 times higher than the compa-
rable white rate (0.3). Looking into shootings involving situations which
TABLE 5
ACTIONS OF PERSONS SHOT FATALLY BY MEMPHIS POLICE,
1969-1976
VICTIMS' ACTIONS VICTIMS' RACES
WHITE BLACK TOTALS
Assaultive-armed with gun 62.5% (5) 26.9% (7) 35.3% (12)
ratea 1.3 2.9 1.9
Assaultive-not armed with gun 25.0% (2) 23.1% (6) 23.5% (8)
rate 0.5 2.5 1.3
Non assaultive-unarmed 12.5% (1) 50.0% (13) 41.2% (14)
rate 0.3 5.4 2.2
TOTALS 23.5% (8) 76.5% (26) 100.0% (34)
rate 2.1 10.7 5.4
n/a = 5
a rate per 100,000 population.
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are more life threatening, we find assaultive blacks not armed with guns
dying at a rate (2.5) five times higher than whites (0.5). Finally, black
representation among those reportedly armed with guns and presuma-
bly leaving officers few alternatives to shooting (2.9 per 100,000) is
slightly more than twice as high as the comparable white rate (1.3).
Taken into to, Table 5's percentages and rates clearly indicate
black disproportion among shooting victims but they also indicate that
this disproportion is greatest where elective shootings of nonassaultive,
unarmed people are concerned. Unless Memphis officers differentially
reported the circumstances of shootings of black and white citizens during
the period studied, the data suggest also that the difference between the
shooting rates of Memphis and New York was not an artifact of report-
ing practices, but was, in fact, a reflection of the great frequency with
which Memphis police shot unarmed blacks. In addition, the table sug-
gests that the Tennessee Advisory Committee was correct in its assess-
ment of the negative impact upon Memphis blacks of the absence of
clear shooting guidelines. Finally, they suggest that Goldkamp's Belief
Perspective I was valid in Memphis during 1969-76. The data strongly
support the assertion that police there did differentiate racially with
their trigger fingers, by shooting blacks in circumstances less threatening
than those in which they shot whites.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has demonstrated that one cannot generalize readily
about police shooting rate disparities. Hopefully, it also provides some
direction for future examinations of shooting rate variation among juris-
dictions and among races. Intensive analyses of those phenomena are
required so that policing in this democratic society can occur with mini-
mal bloodshed. Police shootings are a consequence of violence in the
community and the number of times members of various population
subgroups expose themselves to the danger of being shot at by police;
but levels of police shootings are also greatly affected by organizational
variables. Thus, analysis of the circumstances under which shootings
occur can point the way to police administrative action to reduce elec-
tive shootings. It may also suggest broader social action to change the
conditions which spawn the nonelective shootings over which police
chiefs and police officers have very limited direct control.
Administrative action to reduce elective shootings in Memphis has
occurred since the end of the period studied in this report. In 1979, for
example, that department instituted a more stringent shooting policy
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and incident review procedure than had existed.35 It has also recently
initiated an "officer survival" training program designed to help police
more safely respond to the potentially violent situations which often pre-
cipitate nonelective shootings. In short, apparently the Memphis Police
Department has acted responsibly to address major problems in the use
of deadly force by its officersy 6
Hopefully, future research conducted on the use of deadly force in
Memphis subsequent to the implementation of these measures will find
both reductions in the frequency of shootings and changes in the pat-
terns of shootings. Hopefully also, the future research will encourage
other jurisdictions in which Goldkamp's Belief Perspective I is valid to
follow the example of'Memphis by taking measures to reduce officer
shooting discretion and, consequently, to reduce the rate of elective po-
lice shootings.
35 Memphis Police Department, Training Academy, General Order #5-79, Dead Force Pol-
eOy 1-2 (1979), states that officers may use deadly force in arrest situations only as a last resort
in order "(t)o apprehend a suspect fleeing from the commission of a dangerous felony when
an officer has witnessed the offense or has sufficient information to know as a virtual certainty
that the suspect committed the offense." Geral Order #5-79 defines as "dangerous felonies"
kidnapping, murder in the 1st or 2nd degree, manslaughter, arson, criminal sexual assault,
1st, 2nd, or 3rd degree (rape and attempted rape), aggravated assault, robbery, burglary Ist,
2nd or 3rd degree, or any attempt to commit these crimes. The order also establishes an
internal shooting review procedure.
36 See Memphis Police Made Own Films on Deady Force, 6 TRAINING AIDS DIGEST 1 (Feb.
1981).
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